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1. Introduction  
This paper deals with the economic rationale for regulating shadow banking. It discusses whether the 
regulatory initiatives proposed by academics and policymakers are consistent with this rationale. We 
posit that the ultimate goal of financial regulation is to promote financial stability. Therefore, we 
evaluate shadow banking regulation based on its ability to reduce financial instability efficiently. 
Regulating shadow banking is challenging because shadow banking is often defined by what is not, 
namely licensed or official banking.1 However, such an approach does not capture the essence of the 
shadow banking problem. The official banking system has implicitly or explicitly supported a 
significant part of what is known today as shadow banking. For instance, the Asset Backed Commercial 
Paper (ABCP) conduits or the Structured Investment Vehicles (SIV) that were exposed to the U.S. 
housing market during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) all enjoyed guarantees by banks – so-called 
‘put options’ – by way of contract or reputation.2 The remainder of shadow banking was still 
problematic for financial stability because of the contracts in which shadow banks were counterparty 
to banks. American International Group (AIG), for instance, was counterparty to a significant part of 
                                                      
1 For the definition of licensed banking, see for example, Art. 4.1(1) of the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) which 
defines a “credit institution” as “an undertaking the business of which is to take deposits or other repayable funds from the 
public and to grant credits for its own account.” See ‘Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 Of the European Parliament and of The 
Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation 
(EU) No 648/2012. 
2 Zoltan Pozsar and others, 'Shadow Banking' (2013) 19 Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review 1 
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the banking system relying on Credit Default Swaps (CDS) to insure against the default of Mortgage 
Backed Securities (MBS). 
We start from the observation that shadow banking is effectively banking, albeit carried out in such a 
way as to avoid regulatory constraints. In order for regulation to be effective in promoting financial 
stability, shadow banking is to be defined functionally, based on the contribution to systemic risk. We 
characterize systemic risk as the likelihood of financial system failure, which will impair the financing 
of production and consumption, and thus will have consequences on the performance of the real 
economy. There are different definitions of systemic risk, which are geared towards measuring it.3 
Although we agree on the necessity to improve the measurement of systemic risk, we are sceptical that 
such measurement can ever become so precise as to prevent financial crises. Rather, we prefer to adopt 
a conceptual approach to systemic risk in order to define shadow banking. 
Defining shadow banking in terms of its contribution to systemic crisis implies taking a macro 
perspective to the economics of banking, and deriving regulatory implications from there. In this 
respect, our paper aims at filling an important gap in the law and economics literature, which is the lack 
of consideration for macroeconomics in the economic analysis of law.4 This gap reflects the 
disintegration of finance and monetary economics in the economics profession. Looking at shadow 
banking from a macroeconomics perspective implies taking a ‘money view.’5 One can define shadow 
banking by its ability to fund long-term commitments through short-term liabilities. This maturity 
mismatch creates systemic risk inasmuch as short-term liabilities are considered as safe as money. The 
implied liquidity of such liabilities make them subject to run. 
For purposes of financial stability, regulation of shadow banking should focus on entities and 
transactions allowing liabilities to be accepted as a substitute for money.6 For the banking business to 
be profitable, such safe, liquid, short-term liabilities must be invested in risky, illiquid, long-term assets. 
Therefore, we define banking – both official and shadow – in connection with maturity transformation. 
In this paper, maturity transformation is intended broadly, particularly to include also liquidity 
transformation (financing illiquid assets with liquid liabilities) and credit transformation (enhancing the 
                                                      
3 See Lars Peter Hansen, 'Challenges in identifying and measuring systemic risk' in Markus Brunnermeier and Arvind 
Krishnamurthy, Risk Topography: Systemic Risk and Macro Modeling (NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2011, Volume 26, 
University of Chicago Press 2014) 
See also Viral Acharya, Robert Engle and Matthew Richardson, 'Capital Shortfall: A New Approach to Ranking and 
Regulating Systemic Risks' (2012) 102 American Economic Review 59 
4 Richard A. Posner, 'On the Receipt of the Ronald H. Coase Medal: Uncertainty, the Economic Crisis, and the Future of 
Law and Economics' (2010) 12 American Law and Economics Review 265. One important exception includes Katharina 
Pistor, 'A legal theory of finance' (2013) 41 Journal of Comparative Economics 315 
5 Perry Mehrling, 'Essential hybridity: A money view of FX' (2013) 41 Journal of Comparative Economics 355; Zoltan 
Pozsar, 'Shadow Banking: The Money View' (2014) Office of Financial Research Working Paper  
6 Minsky had historically one of the broadest views of money in economics. This is the view adopted in this essay. As 
Minsky eloquently put it, “everyone can create money; the problem is to get it accepted”. See Hyman P. Minsky, Stabilizing 
an unstable economy (McGraw-Hill 1986, Reprint 2008) 225. 
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credit risk of assets in order to fund them), which currently contribute to defining shadow banking.7 We 
focus on the money-like character of the liabilities to fund assets that do not have the same feature, 
regardless of the maturity of both. We adopt such a broad definition because we are sceptical about 
defining shadow banking based on a list of activities about which we know today. We argue that shadow 
banking may well evolve into activities that we – and importantly, the policymakers – may not yet know 
about, while still generating systemic risk. This is, after all, what happened during the global financial 
crisis. Anchoring the definition of shadow banking to a conceptual framework of systemic risk, instead 
of to a list of systemically relevant activities, allows identifying shadow banking despite financial 
innovation and the imperfection of risk models employed by the financial industry and its regulators.   
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 deals with the problem of shadow banking definition, 
emphasising the advantages, but also the limitations, of an instrument-based definition. Section 3 
discusses the mapping of shadow banking by the FSB and the IMF in light of the challenges in defining 
and monitoring shadow banking. Section 4 discusses the benefits and the costs of shadow banking for 
society. Building upon this framework, section 5 argue that the optimal way to regulate shadow banking 
is to restrict leverage at the assets level, through minimum haircuts regulation. Section 6 evaluates the 
effectiveness and the efficiency of direct and indirect regulation of shadow banking regulation in two 
major jurisdictions, the U.S. and the EU. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Shadow banking (un)defined 
2.1. History of the term 
The term shadow banking as we use it today was coined by PIMCO’s Paul McCulley in 2007 in a 
speech at the annual economic policy symposium of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City in 
Jackson Hole, Wyoming.8 The origins of the concept, however, can be traced back to earlier work 
referring to the shadow banking as the ‘parallel banking system.’9  Following these pristine uses of the 
term, a whole host of unconventional designations were coined to refer to shadow banking. These 
include ‘securitized finance’,10 ‘market-based credit system’,11 ‘nonbank credit intermediation’,12 and 
                                                      
7 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) defines shadow banking as “nontraditional financial intermediation, which is 
determined by the funding source used by financial intermediaries to finance a portion of their assets.” See Artak 
Harutyunyan and others, 'Shedding Light on Shadow Banking' (2015) WP/15/1 IMF Working Paper  7 
 Shadow banking can also be measured using a noncore liability approach which attempt to capturing nontraditional funding. 
See International Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Report: Risk Taking, Liquidity, and Shadow Banking: Curbing 
Excess While Promoting Growth, October 2014) 91 
8 Paul A. McCulley, 'Teton reflections' (2007) 2 PIMCO Global Central Bank Focus  
9 Jane W. D'Arista and Tom Schlesinger', 'The parallel banking system' (1993) Economic Policy Institute Briefing Paper ; 
Pozsar and others, 'Shadow Banking' 
10 Gerard Caprio and Lawrence H. Summers, 'Finance and its Reform: Beyond Laissez-Faire' in Dimitri B. Papadimitriou 
(ed), Stability in the Financial System (Palgrave Macmillan UK 1996) 418 
11 Perry Mehrling and others, 'Bagehot was a shadow banker: shadow banking, central banking, and the future of global 
finance' (2013) Central Banking, and the Future of Global Finance (November 5, 2013)  2 
12 The Group of Thirty: Working Group on Financial Reform, Financial Reform: A framework for financial stability, 2009) 
Financial Stability Board, Progress in the Implementation of the G20 Recommendations for Strengthening Financial Stability: 
Report of the Financial Stability Board to G20 Finance Ministers and Central  Bank Governors, 2011) 
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‘network finance’.13 These multiple designations and definitions added more confusion to the already 
complex and convoluted debate on shadow banking. However, despite its elusive name, shadow 
banking is neither shadowy, nor banking as we know it.14 
Though the term shadow banking entered the common parlance after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), 
shadow banking has a longer history. According to some commentators, shadow banking has existed at 
least since the late 19th century, when the Bank of England initiated a program to stabilize the private 
bills markets by bailing out bill brokers.15 These brokers were not banks. However, they were accepting 
to convert the bills into money,16 an activity that we would call shadow banking today.  
What we know as shadow banking is a multitude of activities that contribute to the vulnerability of the 
financial system. Therefore, they are being studied by academics and policymakers. In this section, we 
review different approaches to defining shadow banking, with the goal to identify a suitable definition 
from a law and economics perspective. 
2.2. Approaches to shadow banking definition 
The variety of financial instruments, institutions, and activities involved in shadow banking does not 
lend itself to a classic definition per genus et differentiam.17 Furthermore, searching for an all-
encompassing definition would be a futile endeavour. Shadow banking should rather be defined by 
reference to the purpose for which it is studied. Since the shadow banking system came in the spotlight 
because of its potential contribution to systemic risk, a useful definition needs to cover the systemic 
risk implications of shadow banking.18  
Currently, there are three approaches to defining shadow banking. Shadow banking may be defined by 
the activities constituting shadow banking. These, for instance, include maturity, liquidity and credit 
transformation so long as they are geared towards performing credit intermediation – namely, taking 
savings from lenders and channelling them towards borrowers. Activity-based definitions may or may 
not exclude credit intermediation performed by banks. Alternatively, shadow banking may be defined 
by the entities carrying out credit intermediation, so long as these entities differ from banks. One 
prominent example of such entities are Money Market Mutual Funds (MMMFs), but there are several 
                                                      
13 Robert Guttmann, Finance-Led Capitalism: Shadow Banking, Re-Regulation, and the Future of Global Markets (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2016) 125 
14 Although shadow banks do not engage in deposit taking, which is key for the legal definition of a bank or credit 
institution, as we will show their activity is very similar to the core function of banking.  
15 Mehrling and others, 'Bagehot was a shadow banker: shadow banking, central banking, and the future of global finance' 
Mehrling draws interesting parallels between the bills market of the late 19th century England and the current functioning of 
the Shadow banking system.  
16 Walter Bagehot, Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market (H.S. King 1873) 
17 This is an Aristotelian pattern of definitions in which definitions are provided by determining their genus to which that 
term belongs and then providing the difference which gives the species and locates the term within that genus. The most 
famous example is humans are rational animals.  
18 Fund, Global Financial Stability Report: Risk Taking, Liquidity, and Shadow Banking: Curbing Excess While Promoting 
Growth 
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others (finance companies, peer-to-peer lenders, hedge funds, and private equity funds, among others). 
Finally, shadow banking may be defined by the instruments through which it is carried out. The 
repurchase agreement (repo),19 namely a contract to borrow on financial collateral, is a case in point. 
Depending on the quality of collateral and its credit enhancement, repo can generate money-like 
liabilities. There are several other examples of such instruments. Importantly, the list is not finite, but 
it includes every credit instrument that can generate safe and liquid liabilities, and hence is potentially 
subject to runs. 
An instrument-based definition is a functional definition anchored to a financial instrument which may 
or may not yet exist. The activity- and entity-based definitions are functional, too, because they reflect 
the systemic risk concerns stemming from shadow banking.20 However, these definitions are static due 
to their reliance on a list of entities and/or activities. Activity- and entity-based definitions are useful to 
identify the object of regulation, whereas an instrument-based approach is more promising for the 
purpose to adapt regulation to unknown challenges for financial stability. 
2.3. Activity-based definitions 
Under the realm of activity-based definitions, shadow banking can be defined broadly as “all financial 
activities, except traditional banking, which require a private or public backstop to operate.”21 A 
backstop is a last-resort risk-absorption commitment that operates when all other forms of insurance 
have failed. It is usually in the form of an (explicit or implicit) put option, which can be private or 
public. An example of private backstop is a credit risk guarantee by a bank, of the kind activated by 
ABCP conduits during the GLC. An example of public backstop is the liquidity put by central banks, 
which ranges from traditional lending of last resort facilities to the more recent programmes of 
distressed assets purchase. A backstop is instrumental to conferring to shadow banking liabilities the 
money-like features (i.e. safety and liquidity) that, along with a mismatch with the assets, make shadow 
banking prone to systemic risk. 
A definition of shadow banking based on backstops is entirely a functional one. The focus is on the 
activities that require a backstop to be undertaken irrespective of what type of financial institutions are 
engaging in such activities. The purpose of this definition is to capture any form of shadow banking, 
present and future. However, it is doubtful that it may achieve this purpose in practice. Backstops, 
particularly if implicit, are difficult to identify whereas systemic risk may build up in their shadow. 
                                                      
19 A repo or repurchase agreement is the sale of securities coupled with a commitment to repurchase them at a specified 
price and at a future date or on demand. See Tobias Adrian and others, 'Repo and Securities Lending' (2012) NBER Working 
Paper Series  2 In the recent financial crisis, the run on repo markets which led to forced deleveraging played a significant 
role in the GFC. See Gary B. Gorton and Andrew Metrick, 'Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo' (2012) 104 Journal of 
Financial Economics 425; Gary B. Gorton, Slapped by the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 2007 (Oxford University Press 
2010) 
20 Fund, Global Financial Stability Report: Risk Taking, Liquidity, and Shadow Banking: Curbing Excess While Promoting 
Growth 
21 Stijn Claessens and Lev Ratnovski, 'What is shadow banking?' (2014) IMF Working Paper  4 
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Shadow banking can be performed formally in the absence of backstops; save that it will indeed require 
a backstop when the systemic risk materializes.  
Moving away from strictly functional definitions, shadow banking can also be defined in the negative, 
particularly as “bank-like financial activities that are conducted outside the traditional commercial 
banking system, many of which are unregulated or lightly regulated.”22 Similarly, the Office of 
Financial Research (OFR) in the United States defines shadow banking as “credit intermediation outside 
the insured depository system, involving leverage, maturity transformation, and the creation of money-
like liabilities.”23 These definitions are easier to operationalize as they focus on the absence of 
regulation in financial intermediation, rather than on activities being in need of backstop. The 
disadvantage of a negative definition is that it results in either too narrow or too vague lists of activities. 
The concrete identification of shadow banking will thus depend on the discretion of the financial 
supervisors. This is not ideal, if only for reasons of legitimacy and legal certainty. This limitation reveals 
the challenges stemming from the dynamic character of shadow banking.  
A slightly different approach to the trade-off between vagueness and under-inclusiveness of activity-
based definitions looks at the root of shadow banking. What has historically differentiated shadow 
banking from financial intermediation is the reliance on financial markets. In this perspective, shadow 
banking has been defined as “money market funding of capital market lending”24 either on the banks’ 
balance sheets or off their balance sheet. This definition captures two crucial features of shadow 
banking: one is the reliance on capital markets (e.g. mortgage securitizations, derivatives) for risk-
taking; the other is reliance on money markets (e.g. repos, commercial paper) for liquidity. It is a small 
step from markets to the instruments that are traded therein. In a similar vein, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) defines shadow banking as “non-traditional financial intermediation, which is determined 
by the funding source used by financial intermediaries to finance a portion of their assets.”25 To capture 
(and measure) non-traditional funding, the IMF relies on the notion of noncore liabilities, which is an 
instrument approach to defining shadow banking. 
Before moving on to discussing the instrument-based definitions, however, it is useful to discuss the 
entity-based definitions for they have a unique advantage over all other approaches. Whereas the legal 
basis for regulating the activities of shadow banking and the instruments they rely upon is not obvious, 
particularly if these activities are identified at the discretion of supervisory agencies, dealing with 
entities is much easier from a legal point of view.26 Whether certain institutions are subject to regulation 
                                                      
22 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Shadow banking and the financial crisis, 2010) 7 
23 Office of Financial Research, Financial Stability Report, 2015) 124 
24 Mehrling and others, 'Bagehot was a shadow banker: shadow banking, central banking, and the future of global finance' 
25 Harutyunyan and others, 'Shedding Light on Shadow Banking' 
26 Willa E. Gibson, 'Are swap agreements securities or futures?: The inadequacies of applying the traditional regulatory 
approach to OTC derivatives transactions' (1999) 24 Journal of Corporation Law 379 416 
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is a policy issue and depends on whether, according to the legislature’s assessment, these institutions 
are in the position to jeopardize financial stability. 
2.4. Entity-based definitions 
The earlier definitions of shadow banking were entity-based. McCulley defined the shadow banking 
system as “the whole alphabet soup of levered up non-bank investment conduits, vehicles, and 
structures” whose liabilities are similar to bank deposits.27 According to Morgan Ricks’ view, repo-
financed dealer firms,
 
securities lenders, SIVs, ABCP conduits, credit hedge funds, and MMMFs can 
all be considered as shadow banks.28 Acharya, Khandwala, and Öncü define shadow banking based on 
their similarity to financial institutions that behave like banks. Although, like banks, these institutions 
borrow short and use leverage to lend and invest in illiquid assets, they are only lightly regulated.29  
If one focuses on the perception of shadow banking by investors, a shadow bank is rather “an institution 
or bank- sponsored special-purpose vehicle that has persuaded its customers that its liabilities can be 
redeemed de facto at par without delay (or can be traded as if they will be executed at par without fail 
at maturity) even though they are not formally protected by government guarantees.”30 Within the 
entity-based definitions of the shadow banking sector, shadow banks might even be given the label of 
“non-banks performing bank-like functions.”31 
Because they all implicitly rely on a functional approach, entity-based definitions are unhelpful to 
identify shadow banking. Virtually any entity of the financial industry could perform shadow banking 
in one way or another. In the European context, a study by the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) 
reveals that most of the ‘Other Financial Institutions’ (OFI) have little engagement in shadow banking 
activities.32 However, a focus on the entities is the ultimate reason why policymakers know anything at 
all about the shadow banking system. 
One big challenge for shadow banking regulation is the lack of granular data. The problem mainly stems 
from the lack of reporting obligations by the OFIs. This gap makes good economic sense so long as the 
activities OFIs engage in do not give rise to systemic risk. However, the lack of information creates 
negative externalities. As we are going to argue, an instrument-based definition of shadow baking could 
help identify the entities producing externalities in the form of systemic risk. Having said this, legal 
                                                      
27 McCulley, 'Teton reflections' 
28 Morgan Ricks, 'Shadow banking and financial regulation' (2010) Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper  3 
29 Fund, Global Financial Stability Report: Risk Taking, Liquidity, and Shadow Banking: Curbing Excess While Promoting 
Growth 
30 Edward J. Kane, 'Shadowy banking: Theft by safety net' (2014) 31 Yale Journal on Regulation 773 776 
31 The “non-banks credit intermediation” is another term for shadow banking used by the FSB. See Reform, Financial Reform: 
A framework for financial stability Board, Progress in the Implementation of the G20 Recommendations for Strengthening 
Financial Stability: Report of the Financial Stability Board to G20 Finance Ministers and Central  Bank Governors ibid 
32 Laurent Grillet-Aubert and others, Assessing Shadow Banking- Non-bank Financial Intermediation in Europe, 2016) 40 
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obligations, including disclosure obligations, are more effectively imposed on entities than on the 
instruments they use. 
2.5. Towards a workable instrument-based definition 
In the policy debate, there is no such thing as an instrument-based definition of shadow banking. A 
relatively similar approach is to base the definition on a mixture of activities and entities. The definition 
adopted by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) is a case in point. According to the FSB, shadow 
banking is to be understood as “credit intermediation involving entities and activities outside the regular 
banking system.”33 Academic commentators have dwelled more into the instruments connecting entities 
to the activities of shadow banking. On the legal side, Steven Schwarcz considers shadow banking as 
“the provision […] of any financial products and services”, not just “the provision by [non-banks] of 
products and services ordinarily provided by traditional banks.”34 Professor Schwarcz’ view of shadow 
banking is therefore broader than the FSB’s definition. On the economists’ side, Gorton and Metrick 
likewise define shadow banking placing more emphasis on the instruments, such as, for instance, “old 
contracts (repo)” or “more esoteric instruments” (like ABCP, ABS, CDO).35 However, the purpose of 
these instruments should always be to replicate functions of traditional banking. 
The above definitions are too vague. They suffer from the lack of a precise connection with systemic 
risk. Instruments such as repos may not be conducive to systemic risk, for instance when large liquidity 
reserves are held against them.36 Conversely, on-balance-sheet securitizations by banks, such as covered 
bonds, may well lead to systemic risk despite their being excluded from the list of instruments of shadow 
banking.37 
If the purpose of regulating shadow banking is to cope with system risk, the definition of shadow 
banking instruments should be linked to maturity transformation broadly conceived. All and only the 
instruments allowing the funding of risky long-term assets (such as a house or exposure to the housing 
market) with short-term liabilities (such as a repo or a marked-to-market derivative) should define 
                                                      
33 Financial Stability Board, Shadow Banking: Strengthening Oversight and Regulation-- Recommedations of the Financial 
Stability Board, 2011) 1 (Emphasis added).  
34 Steven L. Schwarcz, 'Regulating shadow banking' (2012) 31 Review of Banking and Financial Law  621 (Emphasis 
added). 
35 Gorton and Metrick, 'Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo' 
ABCP= Asset-backed Commercial Paper 
ABS= Asset-backed Securities  
CDO= Collateralized Debt Obligation 
36 Ana Fostel and John Geanakoplos, 'Endogenous Collateral Constraints and the Leverage Cycle' (2014) 6 Annual Review 
of Economics 771 17 
37 Since covered bonds subordinate other non-adjusting secured and unsecured creditors, those unsecured creditors would 
find it in their best interest to run on the issuing bank as soon as the first signs of trouble in the bank appear. Hence, by 
concentrating risk on unsecured debt, asset encumbrance stemming from covered bonds may deteriorate the liquidity profile 
of the issuing institution and facilitate a run on financial firms. The high level of asset encumbrance would limit the level of 
unsecured funding. Therefore, in addition to the increased likelihood of runs on banks, the decreased level of unsecured 
funding will also result in reduced market discipline. See Toni Ahnert and others, 'Asset Encumbrance, Bank Funding and 
Financial Fragility' (2016) Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper No 17/2016 ; Reimo Juks, 'Asset encumbrance and its 
relevance for financial stability' (2012) Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review  
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shadow banking. Although an instrument-based definition of this kind is not reflected by the policy 
debate, the IMF approach to identifying shadow banking comes relatively close to it. 
According to the IMF, shadow banking is to be identified based on noncore liabilities. Noncore 
liabilities are defined in contrast to the liabilities of traditional banking, namely demand deposits of 
ultimate creditors (whether individual or institutional). This definition is obviously over-inclusive. In 
fact, it is narrowed down to exclude entities such as non-money-market mutual funds and pension funds, 
which do not engage in any form of maturity transformation. The IMF approach has the important 
advantage to include the forms of shadow banking that are carried out within the banking system. The 
narrow IMF definition of noncore liabilities includes money-like promises by banks and non-banks to 
ultimate investors. The broad IMF definition includes also noncore liabilities issued between financial 
counterparties, whose net impact outside the financial sector is zero. Particularly because this measure 
includes the banks, it gives an important indication of the systemic risk within the financial sector, as 
matched-book obligations typically fail to net out in a financial crisis. 
Conversely, the definition of the FSB includes pretty much all of the financial sector, except regular 
banks. This approach has been criticized because, by focusing on the non-bank financial sector, the 
FSB overlooks the possibility that the systemic risk of shadow banking originates from within regular 
banking.38 Moreover, the FSB definition covers all entities that, like banks, intermediate credit although 
they may not give rise to any systemic risk concerns.39 
Choosing one approach to define shadow banking is not easy, for they all have shortcomings. Activity-
based definitions are under-inclusive or too vague to operationalize in a democratic regulatory system. 
Entity-based definitions may be sufficiently precise to operationalize, but they are ultimately 
uninformative about the source of systemic risk. Moreover, both activity-based and entity-based 
definitions are static and may fail to capture new forms of shadow banking generating systemic risk. 
Instruments-based definitions may fare better in connection with systemic risk, and if carefully crafted, 
can adapt to financial innovation. However, they tend to be over-inclusive, which brings us back to the 
operationalization problem. The best way to define shadow banking is, therefore, a combination of the 
three approaches, with a special focus on the instruments. 
As mentioned, systemic risk stems from the promise of cash immediacy against long-term, risky 
investments (maturity transformation broadly intended). There are not many instruments making such 
promises credible. These instruments can be characterized as collateral, namely assets that may be 
liquidated to make good on the promise even if the borrower defaults. Immediacy promises require the 
                                                      
38 Yingmao Tang, 'Shadow Banking or "Bank's Shadow": Reconceptualising Global Shadow Banking Regulation' in Ross P. 
Buckley, Emilios Avgouleas and Douglas W. Arner (eds), Reconceptualising Global Finance and Its Regulation 
(Cambridge University Press 2016) 333 
39 Claessens and Ratnovski, 'What is shadow banking?' 
 11 
collateral to be liquid. Liquidity implies that the collateral can be turned into cash without losing much 
of its value. 
Banking adds another dimension to the liquidity of collateral, which is leverage.40 Because banks profit 
from transforming debts (long into short, safe into risky), they tend to have as much debt, or leverage, 
as possible.41 Banks can leverage more than any other economic actor because they rely on various 
liquidity puts – from other banks, and ultimately, from the central bank.42 However, leverage is a 
multiplier of losses as well as of gains, as a result of which banks are more fragile than other economic 
actors. In the absence of regulation, the market liquidity of assets increases the leverage possibilities of 
banks (funding liquidity), until the asset price bubble bursts and both market and funding liquidity turns 
in the other direction.43 Liquidity and leverage are, therefore, the defining features of banking, both 
official and shadow.44 
We can then define banking as the business of leveraging on collateral to support liquidity promises. 
This becomes shadow banking when it avoids the regulation of liquidly and leverage imposed on banks 
for the purpose of financial stability. To clarify by way of examples, demand deposits are banking, but 
not shadow banking, because they are subject to both liquidity (reserve requirements) and leverage 
(capital adequacy) regulation of banks. By the same token, MMMFs are shadow banking so long as 
they are not subject to regulatory constraints comparable to those faced by banks. Repos used to be 
shadow banking, but are increasingly less so because banks are a key player in the repo market and 
their operation therein has been curbed by the liquidity and leverage restrictions of Basel III.45 
Derivatives were, and still are, a form of shadow banking because they support leveraged liquidity 
promises, although these are not obvious. A marked-to-market derivative is effectively an overnight 
promise to pay the margin call. Because neither the liquidity (reserve requirement) nor the leverage 
(minimum haircut) of derivatives is regulated, not even indirectly, derivatives markets are still the realm 
of shadow banking. 
This instrument-based approach has several advantages. First, the definition includes all – past, present 
and future – activities giving rise to systemic risk, because it does not rely on particular markets. Rather, 
                                                      
40 Leverage is the amount of debt as a multiple of the equity, which the proportion of collateral that the borrower owns. The 
reciprocal of the leverage is the margin, or haircut, namely the how much collateral the borrower owns relative to the 
outstanding amount of debt. See John Geanakoplos, 'Leverage, Default, and Forgiveness: Lessons from the American and 
European Crises' (2014) 39, Part B Journal of Macroeconomics 313 
41 Another way to put it is that banks profit from owning as little collateral as possible. 
42 Anat R. Admati and Martin Hellwig, The Bankers' New Clothes: What's Wrong with Banking and What to Do about It 
(Princeton University Press 2013) 
43 See Markus K. Brunnermeier and Lasse Heje Pedersen, 'Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity' (2009) 22 The Review 
of Financial Studies 2201 
44 Tobias Adrian and Hyun Song Shin, 'Liquidity and leverage' (2010) 19 Journal of Financial Intermediation 418 
45 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and 
Banking Systems (Bank for International Settlements 2010, Revised in June 2011). This is a form of indirect regulation about 
which see infra text accompanying notes 119-133. 
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this definition relies on the core instruments of banking at all times: liquidity and leverage. Second, this 
definition is functional, but not as vague as a functional activity-based definition. Because financial 
regulation can embed ex-ante the instruments of liquidity and leverage, it can also confer upon a 
regulatory agency the mandate to regulate them across the board, without creating legitimacy concerns. 
Third, the definition is not linked to any particular entity, although this is in fact the practical limitation 
of this approach. Economists have suggested a number of smart ways to monitor liquidity and 
leverage,46 but all these overlook that reporting obligations can only be established effectively on 
specific entities. You cannot regulate something you cannot measure;47 but likewise, you cannot 
measure something you do not know of. For this reason, policymakers should rely on entity-based 
approaches, albeit guided by instrument-based criteria to identify the right entities and adapt this 
identification with time. 
3. Mapping shadow banking through systemic risk 
The key to identifying shadow banking is the maturity transformation function. Maturity transformation 
entails issuing short-term liabilities to finance long-term assets.48 As such, maturity transformation is 
beneficial because it ultimately encourages long-term capital investments.49 Despite providing this 
benefit, shadow banking endangers the financial system both directly via the credit, market and liquidity 
risks taken by shadow banking participants, and indirectly through their interconnectedness with the 
official banking sector.50 Shadow banking increases systemic risk by undertaking maturity 
transformation with excessive leverage.51  
Maturity transformation is inherently fragile.52 Traditionally, banks had a monopoly on maturity 
transformation because they are the only institutions licensed to issue demand deposits.53 With the 
advent of SIVs, other entities such as e.g. investment banks and MMMFs could create deposit-like 
investment opportunities to compete with commercial banks. This is possible by promising on-demand 
redemption at par.54 Such a promise is credible so long as it is backed by collateral widely accepted in 
liquid markets. However, if a liquidity crisis hits, the issuing financial institution must immediately sell 
long-term assets to meet redemption requests by investors. Massive redemption requests undermine 
                                                      
46 See Markus Brunnermeier and Arvind Krishnamurthy, Risk Topography: Systemic Risk and Macro Modeling (NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual 2011, Volume 26, University of Chicago Press 2014) 
47 This is paraphrased from Pozsar, 'Shadow Banking: The Money View': “We cannot monitor what we do not measure.” 
48 Heremans Dirk, 'Regulation of Banking and Financial Markets' in Roger J. Van den Bergh and Alessio M. Pacces (eds), 
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics Volume 9, vol 2 (Edward Elgar Publishing 2011)                
49 Financial Services Authority, The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis (2009) 21 See also  
Gary B. Gorton, Misunderstanding Financial Crises: why we don't see them coming (Oxford University Press 2012)  
50 Swati Ghosh, Ines Gonzalez del Mazo and İnci Ötker-Robe, 'Chasing the shadows: How significant is shadow banking in 
emerging markets?' (2012) The World Bank- Economic Premise 1 
51 Roland Meeks, Benjamin D. Nelson and Piergiorgio Alessandri, 'Shadow banks and macroeconomic instability' (2014) 
Bank of England Working Paper No 487  
52 Tobias Adrian and Adam B. Ashcraft, 'Shadow banking regulation' (2012) Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff 
Report  1 
53 Gorton, Slapped by the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 2007 
54 This is also called ‘breaking the buck’. 
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market pricing because of fire sales of the assets backing the liquidity promise.55 Because shadow 
banking is highly leveraged and depends on market liquidity to sustain debt, market illiquidity can make 
whole shadow banking system quickly insolvent. 
Systemic risk stemming from illiquidity is difficult to reconcile with finance theory. Illiquidity is by 
definition a temporary problem, although it may last for some time. Therefore, it should be both 
privately profitable and socially efficient for arbitrageurs to overcome illiquidity. In reality, however, 
long-term assets are risky and risk can only imperfectly be predicted by statistical models. Whenever 
these models fail, the liquidity of the affected assets is impaired because arbitrageurs can no longer strip 
risk from the assets to turn them into cash-equivalents. Investors fly to quality, which is to say that cash 
becomes the only safe asset.56 In this situation, shadow banks can still avoid insolvency by activating 
the liquidity puts of the official banking system. However, if the shock to the shadow banking is large 
enough, the banks’ funding liquidity will also dry up quickly in the absence of central bank support. 
The fragility of maturity transformation is the reason why banks are protected by a public safety net. 
Since the introduction of deposit insurance, there has been almost no serious runs by depositors on the 
banks of the developed world.57 Formally, shadow banking cannot rely on the banks’ safety net. Shadow 
banking liabilities are not insured. Therefore, they are susceptible to runs. However, even runs on 
shadow banks can be avoided – as runs on banks were avoided prior to the introduction of deposit 
insurance – if the central bank acts as lender of last resort (LLR).58 Lending of last resort is supposed 
to support illiquid banks, which are not (yet) insolvent.59 Because illiquidity is tied to (expectations of) 
insolvency and vice versa, this maxim is conceptually impossible to operationalize. In fact, central 
banks end up intervening as LLR in practically every systemic crisis.60 
Therefore, the FSB has mapped shadow banking based on the systemic risk that would warrant ex-post 
intervention. According to the FSB, shadow banks are the entities engaging in one of the following 
activities: 
                                                      
55 Authority, The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis 
56 Ricardo J. Caballero and Arvind Krishnamurthy, 'Collective Risk Management in a Flight to Quality Episode' (2008) 63 
The Journal of Finance 2195 
57 See Gorton, Slapped by the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 2007 However, even in the recent global financial crisis, there 
were instances of runs on banks such as the run on the Northern Rock. 
58 For more information on the Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) function of central banks, See Xavier Freixas and others, 'Lender 
of Last Resort: What Have We Learned Since Bagehot?' (2000) 18 Journal of Financial Services Research 63 See also Xavier 
Freixas and Bruno M. Parigi, 'The lender of last resort of the 21st century' in Andrew Felton and Carmen M. Reinhart (eds), 
The First Global Financial Crisis of the 21st Century: Part ll June-December 2008 (VoxEU.org Publication 2009) 163 
Historically, the LOLR function in the market was played by private financial institutions. A bold example of taking up of 
such a role in the crisis of 1907 was J. P. Morgan’s provision of liquidity to markets and institutions in the banking panic of 
that year. See Robert F. Bruner and Sean D. Carr, The panic of 1907: lessons learned from the market's perfect storm (John 
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59 Bagehot, Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market  
60 J Bradford DeLong, 'This Time, It Is Not Different: The Persistent Concerns of Financial Macroeconomics' in Alan S. 
Blinder, Andrew W. Lo and Robert W. Solow (eds), Rethinking the Financial Crisis (Russell Sage Foundation and the 
Century Foundation 2012) 
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1. The management of collective investment vehicles which are prone to runs; 
2. Loan provision funded by short-term liabilities;  
3. Intermediation of market activities by short-term funding or secured funding of clients’ assets; 
4. Facilitation of credit creation; 
5. Securitization-based credit intermediation and funding of financial entities. 
From the assets of the non-bank financial entities involved in any of these activities, the FSB has derived 
a measure of shadow banking.61 According to the FSB, at the end of 2014, the size of shadow banking 
in 26 jurisdictions (representing 90% of the global financial assets) was about $36 trillion in the narrow 
measure (excluding entities that do not provide credit intermediation directly). More than 75% of these 
assets were located in the U.S., the UK, or the Eurozone.  
The FSB relies on a list of activities potentially conducive to systemic risk to identify shadow banking. 
Crucially, however, the FSB bases the quantitative analyses on the information reported by the entities 
involved in such activities. As mentioned, the fallacy of this approach is that it is static, thus it may fail 
to capture new forms of shadow banking. Moreover, the FSB approach deliberately excludes banks 
regardless of the activities they engage in, which may overlook regulatory arbitrage within official 
banking. The IMF tries to cope with this limitation by focusing on the noncore liabilities issued by any 
entity, which perform maturity transformation. 
Compared to the FSB, the IMF measure includes some part of official banking, but it excludes 
investments funds such as non-money-market mutual funds. The results of the two estimates, as carried 
out in 2013, are barely comparable even if we look at the broad measures intended to capture every 
possible systemic risk implication. In the U.S., where the role of banks is more limited, the IMF broad 
measure of shadow banking was some $10 trillion lower than the FSB broad measure (about $25 
trillion), due to the role of investment funds. The difference for the Eurozone was larger (some $10 
trillion, with the FSB broad measure being about $25 trillion), but this is difficult to interpret because 
the effect of investment funds and banks on the size of shadow banking go in opposite directions. For 
the UK, the IMF broad measure (about $14 trillion) was some $5 trillion larger than the FSB equivalent 
to reflect the significant involvement of UK banks in shadow banking activities. 
Both the FSB and the IMF acknowledge that their measures of shadow banking may well be over-
inclusive. Both institutions seek to stay on the safe side and rather include too much, than too little, in 
terms of systemic risk. In fact, both measurement exercises suffer from lack of data granularity, which, 
                                                      
61 According to the FSB, “This category includes mainly residual OFIs in some jurisdictions that were not classified into a 
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in turn, stems from the limited information available. While the IMF relies on monetary aggregates 
provided by central banks, the FSB relies on the reporting obligations imposed on financial institutions 
by the national authorities. Particularly the latter vary considerably across jurisdictions. These 
limitations could be overcome by combining entity-based mapping (and reporting obligations) with a 
more instrument-based approach. As we will show in section 5, an efficient regulation of shadow 
banking should be based on the instruments of leverage to support liquidity promises. 
4. The simple economics of shadow banking 
Because shadow banking creates systemic risk by definition, one may wonder why not banning it 
altogether. In this section, we argue that this would not be a good idea. First, a prohibition will probably 
not be effective. As Minsky argued, it is not difficult to create money: “everyone can create money; the 
problem is to get it accepted.”62 Because shadow banking caters to a structural demand for safe assets, 
a ban would not likely be sufficient to deter the private creation of money-like liabilities; it would only 
marginally increase the cost of acceptance. Second, even if one could prohibit shadow banking, this 
would not be efficient. Arguably, a limited amount of shadow banking is welfare increasing, which 
turns the policy question into how regulation can induce the optimal amount of shadow banking. 
In recent decades, financial intermediation has become more and more integrated with capital markets.63 
As adaptive response to the developments of financial intermediation, banks transformed, too. Banks 
increasingly became closer to a model based on bank holding companies controlling several 
subsidiaries.64 In this new framework, traditional commercial banking only represent a fraction of the 
financial institutions. Banks themselves have expanded their shadow banking activities.65 The only 
difference with independent shadow banking is the explicit access to government guarantees, such as 
the liquidity put by the central bank and the credit guarantees by the public sector.66 
Shadow banking plays an important role in contemporary finance. As traditional banking, it channels 
credit to the real economy.67 The comparison of the assets held by shadow banks with those of the 
official banking sector reveals that, after a short dip in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the 
shadow banking system has been growing at the expenses of traditional credit intermediation.68 
                                                      
62 Minsky, Stabilizing an unstable economy 225. 
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Eventually, shadow banking could even overtake traditional banking.69  
The growth of shadow banking is driven by supply-side as well as demand-side factors. As far as the 
supply side is concerned, shadow banking relies on financial markets for productive efficiency. Shadow 
banking has managed to replicate the banking functions at a lower cost, for instance by engaging in 
securitization and providing diversification services, ample choice among risk levels, and third-party 
validation of credit risk. In this model, liquidity puts and other explicit or implicit guarantees by the 
banks sponsoring shadow banking replaced the government safety net, at least so long as the private 
backstops remained credible.70 
One major contributor to the rise of shadow banking has been regulatory arbitrage. Capital arbitrage 
played a major role given the adverse impact of the Basel standards on the profitability of banking.71 
The banking industry used off-balance-sheet structures to mitigate this impact. These off-balance-sheet 
structures involved many activities, instruments, and entities of the shadow banking system. The new 
capital adequacy requirements established under Basel III have placed constraints on the off-balance-
sheet operations of banks, but have not changed the incentives for regulatory arbitrage because they 
increase the cost of doing banking within the regulatory perimeter, as opposed to shadow banking. 
On the demand side, the growth of the shadow banking system is attributable to several macroeconomic 
developments around the world, which created room for new markets. The savings glut starting from 
2003,72 especially from China and the Middle-East, lead to a sizeable demand for safe assets where 
those savings could be safely invested. This shift of the demand for safe assets, however, happened in 
a time when the supply of such assets was diminishing, especially in the U.S., where the government 
debt-to-GDP ratio was shrinking and a considerable amount of the U.S. government debt was retired. 
This shortage of safe assets prompted the private sector to create such assets, at a profit.73 A large 
amount of these assets was created using securitization, repo contracts, and credit derivatives replacing 
government guarantees by implicit or explicit private sector guarantees.74 
In addition to the savings glut, the rise of professional asset management (mutual funds and pension 
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funds) also generated a demand for safe assets for the optimal management of institutional investors’ 
cash balances.75 Since deposit insurance throughout the globe is capped at amounts too low for 
institutions,76 turning to traditional bank liabilities is not an option for institutional investors, even in 
the presence of brokered deposits.77 Banks could cater to this demand through a very old financial 
instrument, the repo, which thanks to over-collateralization (i.e. a haircut on the market value of the 
collateral) and the short maturity provides an efficient substitute for demand deposit. Because the repos’ 
safety does not depend on the amount of the contract, repos are suitable for the cash management needs 
of institutional investors.78 
The ability of shadow banking to supply safe assets in response to the rising demand for them is, in 
principle, efficient for the financial system as well as for the real economy. Firstly, a shortage of safe 
assets creates a macroeconomic imbalance where savings exceed investments, which ultimately leads 
to reduced output and unemployment.79 Moreover, securitization and securities financing transitions 
(SFTs), which are at the heart of the shadow banking, are beneficial for the financial markets. The 
benefits include price discovery, market efficiency, credit creation, and market liquidity. All of this 
translates into more efficient finance and economic growth.80 In sum, by providing alternatives to bank 
deposits for large investors,81 shadow banking benefits society.82 
The key question is, however, the cost of shadow banking for society. This cost can be substantial 
because of systemic risk. The same mechanism to meet the demand for safe assets by global investors 
is responsible for the collapse of the financial system when the promise of safety cannot be honoured. 
In economic terms, this means that safe assets are overproduced due to a negative externality. That is 
to say, the social cost of the liquidity and leverage produced by shadow banking is higher than the 
private cost. Similar to banks, the case for regulating shadow banking stems from the circumstance that 
                                                      
75 Zoltan Pozsar and Manmohan Singh, 'The nonbank-bank nexus and the shadow banking system' (2011) IMF Working 
Papers 1 
76 Currently, the amount insured by the FDIC is $250,000 and in the EU it is €100,000. See Art. 6(1) of the DGS directive. 
For an empirical investigation of deposit insurance coverage, and an analysis of its consequences, see: Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Edward Kane and Luc Laeven, 'Deposit insurance around the world: A comprehensive analysis and database' (2015) 20 
Journal of Financial Stability 155 
77 Brokered deposits are also called jumbo deposits. FDIC defines a brokered deposit as “any deposit accepted by an insured 
depository institution from or through a third party, such as a person or company or organization other than the owner of the 
deposit.” See FDIC (2014), Guidance on Identifying, Accepting, and Reporting Brokered Deposits: Frequently Asked 
Questions. Available at: https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2015/fil15002a.pdf  
Deposit brokerage has popped up to circumvent the upper limits on covered deposits. See Mark D. Vaughan and Timothy J. 
Yeager, '"Cedars" deposits: will they fly?' (2003) The Regional Economist 10 
78 Pozsar and others, 'Shadow Banking' 
79 DeLong, 'This Time, It Is Not Different: The Persistent Concerns of Financial Macroeconomics' 
80 For a brief overview and why some of these expected benefits were overoptimistic, see; European Commission, European 
Financial Stability and Integration Report 2013 (Commission Staff Working Document, April 2014) 107 For the benefits of 
the shadow banking in developing economies, see: Ghosh, Gonzalez del Mazo and Ötker-Robe, 'Chasing the shadows: How 
significant is shadow banking in emerging markets?'; Viral V. Acharya, Hemal Khandwala and T. Sabri Öncü, 'The growth 
of a shadow banking system in emerging markets: Evidence from India' (2013) 39 Journal of International Money and 
Finance 207 
81 Ghosh, Gonzalez del Mazo and Ötker-Robe, 'Chasing the shadows: How significant is shadow banking in emerging 
markets?' 
82 Acharya, Khandwala and Sabri Öncü, 'The growth of a shadow banking system in emerging markets: Evidence from 
India'; Ghosh, Gonzalez del Mazo and Ötker-Robe, 'Chasing the shadows: How significant is shadow banking in emerging 
markets?' 
 18 
shadow-banking crises imposes negative externalities on the rest of the system.  
5. The case for regulating shadow banking  
The negative externalities of shadow banking are the cost of a financial crisis. To prevent such a crisis 
from destroying the financial system, governments support systemically important firms with various 
forms of safety nets, including bailouts. Since the GFC, these safety nets have notably extended to non-
banks, which engaged in shadow banking. Bailouts are perhaps the least important social cost of a 
financial crisis. The persistent reduction of output stemming from the impairment of the financial 
system has been historically a much higher cost.83 Bailouts, however, reveal the weak spots of the 
financial system in a crisis. Looking at bailouts is thus useful to identify the externalities of shadow 
banking, with a view to correcting them through regulation. 
History reveals that the short-term liabilities of institutions that engage in maturity transformation 
(whether banks or shadow banks) are most often subject to bailouts when there is a systemic crisis.84 
The rationale for bailouts is to avoid runs, which are self-fulfilling prophecies of insolvency that can 
bring down an entire financial system. Runs are systemic when the insolvency concerns affect banking 
as a whole, not the idiosyncratic features of one or more institutions. A perception of systemic 
insolvency can happen because of the interconnectedness between the banks (credit channel of 
contagion) or because all banks are invested in the same classes of assets and their value suddenly 
becomes unclear (market channel of contagion). Both factors are usually at play at the same time. 
However, we focus on the market channel because it seems to be the starting point for shadow banking. 
Shadow banks can credibly promise to convert their short-term liabilities into money by investing their 
funds in financial assets, which are marketable. Under certain conditions, specified by risk models, 
these assets can be liquidated safely and deliver the funds necessary to honour the liabilities. One of 
these conditions is the haircut (or margin), which defines the amount of equity that intermediaries have 
to maintain to always make good on their liquidity promise. Importantly, when the asset is considered 
sufficiently liquid, the haircut can be zero – i.e., the collateral itself is sufficient to back the liquidity 
promise. Moreover, shadow banking often relies on a liquidity put by banks for the very unlikely 
situation in which the safety conditions do not hold true.85 Asset safety is based on statistical models 
that can be proved wrong. When this is the case – as, for instance, was the case for Mortgage-Backed 
Securities (MBS) during the global financial crisis – liabilities such as repos, as well as the assets 
backing them, are no longer considered safe. A run on shadow banking ensues. This can spread to the 
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more traditional banking system simply by way of activating the above-mentioned liquidity puts. 
A run on shadow banking differs from a run on a traditional bank,86 but only slightly. In shadow 
banking, the run tries to recreate the safety of the assets backing the shadow bank liabilities by imposing 
higher haircuts for refinancing. This is problematic because if the system does not have enough equity 
to meet the margin call, the price of the collateral will crash. This, in turn, will lead to increasing haircuts 
making more financial intermediaries insolvent. However, this is not the only way in which a run can 
occur on shadow banking. A withdrawal from shadow banking can resemble a more ‘classic’ bank run 
in two situations. First, the collateral may suddenly become unacceptable (i.e. haircut equal to 100%) 
and no refinancing be offered.87 Second, shadow banking liabilities are not always guaranteed by what 
we would call proper collateral in legal terms. For instance, like demand deposits, MMMF shares are 
not collateralized. In addition, banks issue other short-term wholesale liabilities, such as commercial 
paper, which may or may not be collateralized.88 All of these liabilities are susceptible to runs. 
Collateral is still a distinctive feature of banking – both traditional and shadow – if understood in 
economic, not legal terms. What matters to investors is the assets backing the liquidity promises of a 
bank. In economic terms, these assets are collateral regardless of whether lenders can seize them to get 
their money back, which would characterize proper collateral in legal terms. The key issue is whether 
the assets can be liquidated for a price enabling the repayment of short-term debt. In the event of 
illiquidity, the credibility of the bank’s promises depends on how much of this ‘collateral’ it owns to 
absorb the volatility of assets prices. The reciprocal of this equity margin of safety is the leverage. 
In principle, shadow banking can create money-like short-term liabilities, and get them accepted, with 
or without posting collateral in a narrow sense. When collateral is posted, the leverage can be measured 
directly on the asset. This is what lenders do all the time when they set a haircut, which is effectively a 
constraint on leverage. When no collateral is posted, the leverage can be measured only on the balance 
sheet of (shadow) banks as a ratio of liabilities to the market value of the equity. In this case, lenders 
cannot impose a leverage requirement, but can only decide whether to lend or not given the leverage 
they observe. 
The law and economics debate on shadow banking focuses on collateral because that appears to be 
responsible for the externalities of shadow banking. Indeed, collateral crises have been the main driver 
of financial instability in recent times. Shadow banking has promised immediacy (i.e. money) against 
securities (i.e. collateral) deemed safe according to the prevailing risk models. Upon materialization of 
tail risk undermining this perceived safety, collateral crises have ensued, triggering withdrawals from 
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all sorts of collateralized lending. The latter typically includes repos, but as illustrated earlier, 
derivatives follow the same logic. When haircuts go up, asset prices go down because the agents with 
leveraged long positions lose wealth and must sell, whereas new agents cannot leverage as much as to 
absorb the forced sales.89 Haircuts are a measure of leverage, but because we speak about banking, 
leverage implies liquidity and vice versa. Rising haircuts on several classes of assets mean systemic 
bank runs that reduce market liquidity and funding liquidity simultaneously.90 Such runs can only be 
stopped by a central bank credible enough to recreate the perception of safety that was lost. Showing 
willingness to buy any quantity of the distressed assets at a given price, the central bank effectively sets 
an upper limit on haircuts and, by stabilizing the price of the assets being levered upon, stops a financial 
crisis. 
Unfortunately, by stopping a collateral crisis, the central bank suspends market discipline, too. Assets 
purchased by the central bank cannot be worth less than what the central bank is willing to pay for them. 
They become ‘safe’ again precisely for this reason. Although this kind of intervention is supposed to 
remedy illiquidity, it can conceal insolvency. More important, expectations of such central bank 
intervention fuel moral hazard. With moral hazard in place, the negative externalities of shadow banking 
are exacerbated. The overproduction of safe assets by the private sector, which characterizes shadow 
banking, would be an even bigger problem if central banks guaranteed the safety of collateral at no cost. 
In order to address this problem, some commentators have proposed to charge for the prospective 
liquidity insurance by the central bank. To operationalize this levy, access to collateral for short-term 
funding should be restricted. This could be done by reserving collateralized borrowing to a special class 
of financial institutions, which would be regulated and pay for insurance, like banks do for deposit 
insurance.91 Alternatively, the levy could be charged as a condition for collateral to enjoy the bankruptcy 
law privileges that make it attractive for backing short-term liabilities.92 Collateral in repos and marked-
to-market derivatives can be seized immediately in case of default, by way of exception to the 
bankruptcy rules. Charging for the use of bankruptcy-exempt collateral is effectively a Pigovian tax to 
correct the externality, aiming to make shadow banks bear ex-ante the social cost of illiquidity.93  
Although we agree that regulation of shadow banking should be instrument-based, we think that an 
approach based on liquidity insurance has the following shortcomings. First, it would be overly difficult 
to set price this insurance accurately. The unavoidable intervention by central banks in collateral crises 
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makes liquidity a public good. The liquidity provided by central banks works because it is unlimited, 
hence it is non-rival and no-one can be credibly excluded from it when there is a systemic crisis. Setting 
the price of public goods is always difficult, but pricing a liquidity put can be a daunting task. To avoid 
moral hazard, the price of insurance should be risk-based. However, the risk of illiquidity is systemic, 
which as we discussed is difficult to define, let alone to measure. Although we acknowledge the efforts 
by authoritative economists to measure systemic risk,94 this measurement will never be precise because 
of Knightian uncertainty. Because illiquidity stems from the failure of credit risk models, there is no 
reason why systemic risk models, however sophisticated, should be infallible. 
As second problem with charging for the central bank’s liquidity put is time inconsistency. The threat 
to withhold the liquidity put from those who have not paid the insurance premium is not credible. As 
soon as the collateral becomes systemic, the central bank’s liquidity put is the tool of last resort to avoid 
financial collapse. Note that this problem cannot be overcome ex-ante, for instance by imposing an 
automatic stay on uninsured collateral in the event of default. Because lenders do not run on the 
collateral, but on the liabilities backed by it, fire sales of collateral happen much earlier than default. 
Therefore, the automatic stay may only accelerate default by making lenders more nervous.  
Furthermore, as mentioned, the economic definition of collateral is much broader than the legal 
definition. This leads us to the third problem with a liquidity tax: it can only be imposed on entities or 
instruments we know of. We do not know how shadow banking will look like in the future. In the future, 
shadow banking may not rely explicitly on collateral as we know it, but still produce money-like 
liabilities in such proportions as to claim the liquidity put by the central bank during a financial crisis. 
Note that large banks have been playing this strategy for centuries, with and without collateral. 
Due to the above concerns, we do not think that restricting access to collateral as a way to charge for 
liquidity insurance could work. In fact, rather than curbing shadow banking, this approach may miss it 
altogether. This would be a serious problem in light of the macroeconomic imbalances feeding on 
shadow banking. Currently, the global excess demand for safe assets pushes yields down, and central 
banks have been accommodating this to avoid depression. But that cannot be the end of story. The 
ultimate consumers of safe assets – the asset management industry measuring some $86 trillion 
worldwide – need yield too, if only to fund retirement payments, which are increasing due to 
demographic factors. As we will discuss in the next section, post-GFC regulation has curbed the ability 
of the official banking sector to leverage, take risks, and provide liquidity. Therefore, the demand for 
safe assets delivering some yield must be satisfied by some other parts of the financial system. Shadow 
banking is the natural candidate for this. 
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To cope with the externalities of shadow banking, we rather advocate quantity regulation. In general, 
quantity regulation is preferable to a Pigovian tax when the social cost is difficult to estimate, as the 
individual contribution to systemic risk by shadow banks. Moreover, quantity regulation is relatively 
easy to implement via a single policy variable, which is leverage. Finally, leverage is a model-free 
indicator in terms of which regulatory requirements can be established ex-ante. Leverage is a necessary 
condition for shadow banking, so the latter can be identified and cut down in size through the former. 
Following the economic literature advocating monitoring and curbing leverage on the assets that can 
be pledged as collateral,95 we argue that shadow banking should be regulated indirectly, by capping the 
admissible levels of leverage on these assets. 
In our opinion, minimum haircuts should be established on every debt contract generating short-term, 
money-like liabilities. Furthermore, because short-term liabilities could be issued without explicit 
reference to collateral, leverage should be monitored and restricted at the level of entities making such 
promises, too. This would seem to put us back into the difficulty of mapping the entities constituting 
shadow banking at any point in time. However, it is practically difficult to imagine credible liquidity 
promises which are not backed by marketable assets or a robust liquidity put. Banks are able to make 
unsecured promises because they rely on a web of credit and liquidity puts from the public sector. For 
this reason, banks’ leverage is directly regulated. Such regulation does extend to shadow banking in as 
much as it is sponsored by banks. This is another form of indirect regulation, which actually exists 
already, as we will illustrate in the next section. 
The advantage of our approach is that it identifies all the items of the financial system requiring 
backstops (or bailout) in the event of a crisis. These are the assets being levered upon to promise 
liquidity and the banks that back up such liquidity promises. Financial innovation must use one of these 
channels to create private money and hence systemic risk. Importantly, these channels are defined 
broadly enough to capture different ways in which shadow baking may play out in different 
jurisdictions. This is very useful for international cooperation, which is essential to regulate shadow 
banking effectively. At the same time, asset leverage and bank leverage restrictions are sufficiently 
specific concepts to embed into legislation, which overcomes the legitimacy concerns that could arise 
if these restrictions were to be established exclusively by regulatory agencies. 
Two challenges remain, however. The first challenge is to set the minimum haircuts (maximum 
leverage) at the right level, bearing in mind that excessive curbs on (shadow) banking undermine 
efficiency. The second challenge is to adjust these regulations over time. Dealing with the first problem 
requires statistical models. These models, however, would be simpler than the models used to measure 
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systemic risk. Setting conservative haircuts only requires identifying the worst-case scenario for each 
class of assets. The second problem is more difficult to deal with. On the one hand, new classes of assets 
may be used for leverage. On the other hand, the conservative haircuts will have to be adapted to new 
circumstances, in one direction or another. The adaptation problem depends on the same reason why, 
in the end, all preventative regulations to minimize systemic risk – including shadow banking regulation 
– will fail and require crisis management. This is a general problem in the pursuit of financial stability 
as a policy goal. We argue that the regulation of leverage, particularly at the asset level, fares better 
than alternative approaches to regulate shadow banking. However, the efficient regulation of shadow 
banking, as of any other source of systemic risk, calls upon financial regulators to exercise some 
discretion in order to adapt to unforeseen circumstances. 
6. Regulatory responses to shadow banking 
It is often argued that shadow banking played a key role in the global financial crisis because of lack of 
regulation. This is not entirely correct. The participants in the shadow banking system were, and still 
are, regulated individually. However, regulators have failed to see the forest for the trees and 
concentrated on regulating separate parts of the system, without considering the impact of regulation 
on shadow banking as a whole. 
In this section, we take a different approach to review the regulation of shadow banking. Having 
identified the roots of shadow banking in leveraging on financial assets, which is instrumental to 
liquidity promises, we look at the entities that perform this activity or support it indirectly. Moreover, 
to cope with regulatory arbitrage and financial innovation, we focus on how regulation addresses the 
instruments of shadow banking. 
The regulation of shadow banking entities may be direct or indirect. Direct regulation of shadow 
banking focuses on shadow banks as we know them, and tries to address the systemic risk stemming 
from their operation. MMMFs are a case in point. Direct regulation also tries to adapt to new forms of 
shadow banking, either by defining new entities based on certain activities (roughly the EU approach) 
or by giving regulators the authority to include new entities into the regulatory perimeter (basically the 
U.S. approach). Shadow banking may also be regulated indirectly, through its connections with the 
banks. For instance, because the largest securities dealers are associated with banks, they are affected 
by the regulation of bank capital. This is important in view of shadow banking’s reliance on backstops 
from the official banking sector (and hence, from the public sector). Other examples of this approach 
include the regulation of banks’ large exposures as well as the structural regulations aimed to separate 
traditional banking from shadow banking. Indirect regulation of this kind may have unintended 
consequences. Increasing the regulatory burden on the banking industry tends to push shadow banking 
towards bank-independent entities that may escape regulation’s outreach. 
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Another form of indirect regulation is based on the instruments of shadow banking. Examples include, 
among others, securitization, repos, and derivatives. These are all instruments of leverage based on 
liquidity promises. Securitization generates market liquidity for illiquid assets; repos transforms market 
liquidity into funding liquidity; and derivatives allow all kinds of synthetic leverage via the exposure to 
a notional amount. All of these instruments rely on some sort of collateral. Regulatory reforms aim to 
improve the transparency of this collateral and to constrain shadow banking by capping the admissible 
leverage at the asset level.96 The advantage of this approach is that, so long as the instruments to regulate 
are defined functionally, regulation may remain effective despite financial innovation. Moreover, if 
collateral is monitored carefully, cutting ties with the banking system would not be an effective strategy 
for regulatory arbitrage. As a practical matter, both these conditions for an effective instrument-based 
regulation are not perfectly attainable. Combining entity-based and instrument-based regulation of 
leverage is therefore necessary to cope with the systemic risk implications of shadow banking. 
There are several ongoing regulatory reforms around the world. We critically review only the regulation 
of shadow banking in the U.S. and the EU, which are expected to provide the main regulatory models.97 
 
6.1. Entity-based regulation 
6.1.1. Direct regulation 
The EU response to shadow banking includes both entities-based and instrument-based regulation. In 
March 2012, the European Commission launched a public consultation, after which a two-fold 
legislative package was proposed.98 The first part is the Regulation on Transparency of Securities 
Financing Transactions and of Reuse (SFTR).99 Because this is an instrument-based approach to shadow 
banking regulation, we will discuss it in the next subsection. The second prong of the EU response is 
instead entity-based. It consists of a proposal to directly regulate MMMFs,100 which essentially follows 
the U.S. model of MMMF regulation.101 
MMMFs are financial intermediaries that connect short-term debt issuers with providers of funds who 
need daily liquidity. Starting from the 1970s, in the U.S., financial products developed by the MMMFs, 
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called NOW accounts (Negotiable Order of Withdrawal), were widely accepted as a direct substitute 
for bank deposit. These products were the pioneering examples of shadow banking disintermediating 
depository institutions. Currently, CNAV (Constant Net Asset Value) MMMFs are substitutes for 
insured deposits. They provide a source of safe assets for those institutional investors having surplus 
funds who need to keep such funds liquid. MMMFs are supposed to make good on the promise to never 
‘break the buck.’ However, when the Reserve Primary Fund was unable to keep that promise during 
the GFC, public authorities were forced to intervene and offer a liquidity put to all MMMFs. This 
circumstance drew attention to the risk of runs on MMMFs, calling for the regulation of such entities. 
Although MMMF provide a functional substitute of a bank’s demand deposit, legally speaking they are 
mutual funds. Formally, MMMF are not leveraged because their liabilities are equities. The problem is 
that MMMF promise to redeem their equities at par. Therefore, regulation should either prohibit such a 
promise, by imposing a floating NAV, or impose on the funds that offer CNAV leverage and/or liquidity 
restrictions comparable to those applicable to banks. Although a proposal was made to combine these 
approaches,102 on both sides of the Atlantic regulation has chosen to allow MMMF to offer a stable 
NAV under strict liquidity conditions.  
In the U.S., the Securities and Exchange Commission overhauled rule 2a-7, imposing on MMMF 
restrictions in terms of investment diversification and liquidity, as well as customer profiling.103 Today, 
in order to be able to offer CNAV to institutional investors, funds must invest almost exclusively in 
government securities.104 Additional rules are established to disincentivize redemptions in situations of 
stress. The EU draft regulation is very similar to the U.S. regulation. Although the European 
Commission initially proposed to mandate a 3% capital buffer on all CNAV funds,105 this proposal was 
scrapped at the request of the European Parliament. The compromise agreed upon by the EU institutions 
allows funds to offer CNAV only if they invest in public debt or in a new class of low volatility assets, 
which are narrowly defined in terms of liquidity and residual maturity.106  
The approach by the American and the European regulators seeks to avoid runs on MMMF by imposing 
liquidity rules. In principle, this approach cannot rule out runs in the absence of insurance.107 However, 
restricting the investments of MMMFs to government securities effectively implies a liquidity put by 
the central banks dealing in these securities. 
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Although MMMFs are large (some Euro 3,2 trillion as of 2014),108 shadow banking includes much 
more than MMMFs. Including more entities into shadow banking is challenging because while many 
entities potentially qualify, they do not necessarily create systemic risk.109 Regulating financial entities 
in the absence of systemic risk is usually inefficient. Moreover, because the participants in the shadow 
banking system change with time,110 entity-based approaches to regulation, however sophisticated, 
become quickly outdated. Nevertheless, in both the U.S. and the EU, regulation tries to include 
dynamically new entities into the regulatory perimeter of shadow banking.  
In the EU, regulation seeks to capture new forms of shadow banking through the Alternative Investment 
Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD).111 This Directive includes hedge funds, private equity funds, real-
estate funds, and infrastructure funds as Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs). The AIFMD requires 
managers of AIFs to report their leverage and liquidity policies to the competent supervisory 
authorities.112 Moreover, the AIFMD enables regulation of both liquidity and leverage in order to reduce 
systemic risk.113 On the contrary, no leverage or liquidity requirements are established on investment 
funds in the U.S. However, the Dodd-Frank Act grants the Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(FSOC) the authority to determine whether a non-bank financial company (NBFC) should be supervised 
by the Federal Reserve and be subject to enhanced prudential standards, possibly even more stringent 
than those applying to regular banks.114 To date, the FSOC designated four firms as Systemically 
Important NBFC including American International Group, Inc., (AIG), General Electric Capital 
Corporation, Inc. (GE Capital), Prudential Financial, Inc. (Prudential), and MetLife, Inc. (MetLife).115 
MetLife could successfully challenge the constitutionality of its designation116 and overturned it on the 
grounds of arbitrariness.117  
This U.S.–EU comparison reveals a fundamental trade-off in designing the adaptation strategy of a 
direct, entity-based regulation of shadow banking. This strategy may rely on a list of entities. Although 
the precise identification of entities facilitates enforcement, it may be both over-inclusive and under-
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inclusive with respect to systemic risk, particularly in a dynamic perspective. A strategy relying on the 
discretion of regulators is preferable to adapt to unforeseen circumstances. However, from a legal 
perspective, this strategy creates legitimacy concerns, which may be well founded from an economic 
standpoint in the absence of an incentive-compatible governance of financial regulators.118 The indirect 
regulation of shadow banking aims to overcome these problems. 
6.1.2. Indirect regulation  
Somewhat counterintuitively, a key constrain on shadow banking stems from the regulation of banking 
proper. In particular, the Basel III standards require banks to fund themselves with more equity and of 
higher quality, impose new liquidity requirements, and overall aim to keep bank size manageable in the 
event of a crisis (i.e., to avoid the too-big-to-fail problem).119 Such requirements affect shadow banking, 
too, to the extent that it is affiliated or otherwise interconnected with banks. 
The first consequence of Basel III on shadow banking is the treatment of off-balance-sheet vehicles, 
such as ABCP conduits. Prior to the GFC, these vehicles were not subject to capital regulation. Today, 
capital requirements are to be applied to consolidated securitization transactions and ABCP conduits of 
depository institutions.120 The on-balance-sheet treatment of the securitization will increase the capital 
requirements of banks.121 Although shadow banking could avoid those in the absence of affiliation with 
a bank, this is a rather theoretical scenario. Shadow banking needs collateral or a liquidity put. By 
imposing capital requirements on the latter, the reform reduces the scope for regulatory arbitrage. The 
downside is that genuine risk transfer to third parties no longer enjoys regulatory capital relief.122  
Another important feature of Basel III is the introduction of liquidity requirements, such as the liquidity 
coverage ratio (LCR)123 and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR).124 These requirements aim to stop 
sudden flights to liquidity, which are disruptive. Liquidity requirements are based on the idea that 
reliance on short-term funding can be highly contagious in the event of exogenous shocks to a bank.125 
Liquidity crises are, however, endogenous. In this perspective, liquidity requirements rather matter as 
a constraint on the growth of (shadow) banking. Neither the LCR nor the NSFR are defined as 
requirements to hold an amount of cash (or cash-equivalent) against short-term liabilities, as they should 
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be.126 However, if these were proper liquidity requirements, they would operate in the same fashion as 
the reserve requirements for demand deposits. Reserve requirements constrain the ability of banks to 
lever on collateral, because a part of the latter must always be set aside for any amount of short-term 
liabilities issued. Liquidity requirements for banks constrain shadow banking indirectly. Although 
independent shadow banks could theoretically do away with these requirements, this would be 
unthinkable in the absence of a liquidity backstop from a depository institution. One of the purpose of 
liquidity regulation is indeed to make such backstops from banks more expensive.127  
Basel III has also introduced a straight leverage ratio, which is invariant to the risk of the banks’ 
investments.128 In the U.S., this is called Supplementary Leverage Ratio (SLR) and it is more stringent 
than in the EU. In the U.S., banks need to fund at least 6% of their asset with equity, whereas the 
European requirement is only 3% and has still to be phased in. Supplementing the traditional risk-
weighted capital regulation with leverage restrictions makes regulatory arbitrage more difficult, but it 
comes at a cost. All else being equal, institutions subject to a SLR will rather choose riskier investments. 
Moreover, financial institutions will try to avoid the leverage ratio to start with. Both these issues reflect 
on shadow banking, as revealed by the experience with the SLR in the U.S. 
Recent studies found that pursuant to the introduction of the SLR in 2014, repo borrowing by bank-
affiliated broker-dealers has decreased,129 but the use of repo backed by riskier collateral has 
increased.130 In addition, there is indirect evidence that bank-affiliated broker-dealers have been 
discouraged from borrowing in tri-party repo markets.131 This development was concomitant with an 
increase in the activity of non-bank-affiliated dealers entering tri-party repo markets. This suggests that 
risk-taking in the repo markets is shifting from the banking sector to independent shadow banking.132 
A similar development may be predicted for Europe. Pushing certain risks away from official banking, 
leverage regulations may increase the overall fragility of the credit intermediation system.133 Besides, 
risk-insensitive leverage restrictions undermine efficient risk-taking by both shadow and official banks.  
Banking regulation may indirectly constrain independent shadow banking, too, by limiting the exposure 
of banks to counterparty risk. In the EU, an exposure is large if it exceeds 10% of an institution’s eligible 
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capital.134 Exposures exceeding 25% of the capital or €150 million are prohibited.135 Similar rules apply 
to U.S. depository institutions and under Basel III.136 These exposure limits are meant to ensure that a 
bank will not become insolvent upon the failure of one large counterparty. Because large counterparties 
can be shadow banks, exposure limits may limit the reliance of shadow banks on bank funding or 
liquidity puts. More in general, focusing on the largest exposures of the largest banks is a good strategy 
to identify systemic risk without having to rely on particular entities definitions or risk models.137 
A final way to constrain shadow banking indirectly is to prohibit, by way of structural regulation, banks 
from engaging in it.138 Having a tradition of such a structural regulation, dating back to the separation 
between commercial and investment banking, the U.S. has pioneered this approach with the Volcker 
Rule.139 This rule aims to limit the extension of government backstops from depository to non-
depository institutions by prohibiting the former from engaging in proprietary trading either directly or 
by sponsoring investment funds.140 Although the Volcker rule limits the interconnectedness between 
traditional and shadow banking, it is necessarily imprecise in defining the latter and may have other 
unintended consequences. In particular, the Volcker Rule may increase systemic risk by incentivizing 
financial institutions to shift their proprietary trading to “a frailer part of the financial system.141 Similar 
considerations apply to the EU version of the Volker rule, which has been proposed by the European 
Commission along similar lines.142 The UK approach to structural regulation is slightly different. 
Acknowledging the difficulties to identify shadow banking for the purpose of separation, the UK 
regulation rather defines core banking services and mandates their ring-fencing of their liabilities from 
any other activity carried out within the group.143 
Structural reforms may do more harm than good. They tend to decrease market liquidity and to push 
credit intermediation into independent shadow banking. Moreover, they are unlikely to be as effective 
in curbing the government support as the prudential regulations that indirectly affect shadow banking, 
such as the consolidation obligations and the new rules on liquidity and leverage. These rules affect the 
banks’ operational choices via the pricing of their liquidity put to shadow banking. Finally, whether 
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prudential or structural, banking regulation cannot reach out to independent entities engaging in shadow 
banking. In order for regulation to restrict this kind of shadow banking, an instrument-based approach 
is required.  
6.2. Instrument-based regulation 
Regulation can curb shadow banking by restricting its instruments. This is another form of indirect 
regulation, which – as we argued in Section 5 – is effective and may be efficient so long as it covers all 
the instruments of shadow banking and for each of them identifies the optimal leverage. The most 
important instrument of shadow banking addressed by regulation is the collateral, which underlies 
shadow banking activities such as securitization, repos, and derivatives.  
After the GFC, securitization has been regulated extensively. As discussed earlier, banks investing in 
securitizations even indirectly face enhanced capital requirements. In addition, the post-GFC regulation 
of securitization mandates a minimum risk retention at the source of securitization. The U.S. Dodd-
Frank Act, at section 941, requires that originators retain an interest of at least 5%.144 Similar rules are 
established by the EU banking capital regulation.145 The EU has extended the risk retention requirement 
to non-banks via the AIFMD Directive.146 Risk retention requirements limit leverage in securitizations. 
However, they are invariant to the risks underlying securitization. This can lead to regulatory arbitrage. 
Moreover, the risk retention requirements may be too high for certain loans, which would then cease to 
be securitized. Assuming that regulation can cope with regulatory arbitrage, the cap on leverage 
stemming from such requirements may make some securitizations uneconomical.147 Over-regulation 
might have contributed to securitization essentially disappearing from financial markets after the GFC. 
Securitization has been instrumental to shadow banking by providing suitable collateral for short-term 
funding.148 Collateralized short-term funding remains a key feature of shadow banking. Shadow banks 
fund themselves mainly, albeit not exclusively, through repos. Repos are collateralized loans on the 
global money market, typically with a maturity of one or a few days. Repos are exposed to run. The 
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regulation of collateral addresses this core vulnerability of shadow banking.149  
One issue about collateral is that the lender can reuse it to obtain financing. This practice is called 
rehypothecation and is particularly troublesome for systemic risk.150 Volatility in collateral prices may 
lead to a run on the liabilities backed by such collateral.151 Not knowing where the collateral initially 
posted ended up, borrowers may run as well and close their positions to repossess the collateral.152 
Brokers with matched books on both sides of such transactions, which technically face no risk, may 
suddenly get in trouble.  
Regulation of collateral in the U.S. is entity-based and focuses on prime brokers as the key players in 
collateral intermediation. Federal Reserve Regulation T153 and SEC Rule 15c3-3154 allow prime brokers 
to rehypothecate collateral up to 140% of their clients’ liabilities. The EU has chosen instead an 
instrument-based approach, adopting a regulation of collateral in securities financing transactions 
(SFTR), which is set to take effect from 2018.155 This regulation requires any firm engaging in repos or 
securities lending to report such transactions to trade repositories. The information to be reported 
notably includes leverage.156 Moreover, the SFTR regulation sets out limits on rehypothecation, by 
requiring prior consent for the reuse of collateral by the counterparty, who must be duly informed about 
the consequences of such reuse.157 
The European instrument-based approach has two advantages. First, it generates the information and 
the data that is needed to monitor the systemic risk stemming from shadow banking directly at the 
source, which is leverage. Second, because regulation applies to the transaction level, it is much more 
difficult to circumvent, at least so long as short-term funding is collateralized. This is also the limitation 
of this approach. Although this is difficult to imagine today, shadow banking might come up with 
innovative sources of funding that have nothing to do with securities financing. The U.S. entities-based 
approach would cope better with this circumstance so long as the funding still had to be channeled 
through prime brokerage, or through an affiliation with a BHC. As shown in the previous section, the 
official banking system is constrained by leverage and liquidity restrictions, which indirectly affect the 
amount of shadow banking that banks can sponsor or simply participate in. 
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Another important channel of transmission of systemic risk is the market infrastructure. For instance, 
repo contracts differ in the way they are settled. During the GFC, increases in the haircuts for certain 
assets classes were documented in the bilateral setting, where parties directly trade collateral against 
cash.158 However, no significant haircut increase was observed in tri-party repo markets.159 In tri-party 
repo markets the collateral is managed by two global dealer banks – Bank of New York Mellon and JP 
Morgan Chase – that basically act as clearinghouses. During the GFC, runs on tri-party repos followed 
the more classic pattern of sudden refusal to lend to specific counterparties.160 
This suggests that the central management of collateral is more efficient. Not only counterparty risk 
management is improved by netting, but also the clearing institutions have strong incentives to get 
collateral pricing and margins right. Moreover, clearing institutions can be made subject to reporting 
requirements and other obligations instrumental to monitoring and regulating leverage. For these 
reasons, there is broad academic support for central clearing of repos,161 which has not yet been picked 
up by policymakers. One of the disadvantages of central clearing is that the clearinghouses may become 
too big to fail.162 This is no different from the current situation of the U.S. tri-party repo market. On the 
other hand, because the bulk of repos is still intermediated by official banks, the size of the repo market 
is indirectly constrained by the bank regulation of liquidity and leverage.163 
Both in Europe and in the U.S.,164 certain classes of OTC derivatives are to be settled centrally. This is 
another important piece of instrument-based regulation because, as mentioned, derivatives are a sneaky 
way to build up leverage, and hence systemic risk, through the obligation to pay margins. Effective 
June 2016, the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR)165 requires certain derivatives to be 
cleared through central counterparties (CCPs). Not only will this improve the transparency of shadow 
banking, but it will also allow, in time, to constrain it via minimum haircut regulation. 
As discussed in section 5, minimum haircut regulation can be very effective to constrain the externalities 
of shadow banking. Implementing such regulation only requires that the management of collateral be 
restricted to specific entities. In this perspective, the EMIR may also be used as a tool for 
macroprudential regulation, allowing to set countercyclical margin requirements on derivative 
transactions and, in the future, on all the leverage instruments of shadow banking.166 Establishing such 
regulation of shadow banking remain challenging. As mentioned earlier, for haircut regulation to be 
efficient, regulators must be able to identify leverage restrictions across several classes of assets being 
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used by shadow banking, and to adapt this regulation over time. Still, we believe that a quantity 
regulation of shadow banking via minimum haircuts is preferable to other forms of collateral regulation. 
Another way to regulate collateral is via its bankruptcy law regime. As mentioned, the collateral of 
repos and derivatives transactions (so-called Qualified Financial Contracts) is exempted from the 
automatic stay on the borrower’s assets in case of bankruptcy. After the GFC, this exemption has come 
under fire on the grounds that if fuels fire sales and collateral crisis.167 And yet, this exemption has 
advantages, too.168 In general, removing the automatic stay exception would act as a curb on repos by 
reducing the liquidity of the collateral, particularly in tri-party markets.169 This could be a sensible 
regulatory measure to reduce the reliance on lower-quality collateral, akin to setting minimum haircuts. 
However, it would be probably unwarranted for higher-quality collateral, such as most government-
guaranteed securities. 
Scrapping the bankruptcy law exception may be as effective in curbing repos and derivatives as the 
minimum haircut regulation that we advocate, but because it affects indistinctively high-quality and 
low-quality collateral, it is less efficient.170 The proposal to make the QFC regime conditional on the 
payment of a tax, or liquidity insurance, could overcome this problem so long as the tax rate would vary 
with the quality of collateral. However, the fundamental problem of proposals of this kind is that shadow 
banking is not necessarily operated via repos or derivatives, and may well rely on collateral that is not 
bankruptcy remote. Think, for instance, of commercial paper, which is not exempt from bankruptcy 
law and yet has funded shadow banking. Moreover, financial innovation might come up with other 
transactions for which the bankruptcy regime is irrelevant. If reliance on bankruptcy-remote collateral 
is not essential to shadow banking, the proposals to regulate the latter by restricting access to the former 
are unlikely to be effective. 
7. Conclusion 
In this essay, we have analysed the economics of shadow banking and the case for its regulation. We 
have noted an important challenge in addressing shadow banking, which is to define it. After reviewing 
the main approaches to defining shadow banking – based on its activities, entities, and instruments – 
we have concluded that all of them have shortcomings. In order to connect shadow banking with 
systemic risk, we have argued in favour of an instrument-based approach, defining banking as 
leveraging on collateral to support liquidity promises. Such a banking qualifies as shadow banking if it 
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is not subject to the same leverage and liquidity regulation as official banking. Having said that, an 
effective instrument-based regulation presupposes that the entities having access to the relevant 
instruments are subject to reporting obligations. 
Furthermore, we have discussed the optimal regulation of shadow banking from a law and economics 
perspective. Shadow banking is beneficial for society because it caters to a demand for safe assets. 
However, because of negative externalities, shadow banking tends to overproduce safe assets. We have 
argued that, because uncertainty makes any measure of systemic risk imprecise, quantity regulation is 
preferable to a Pigovian tax to cope with the externalities of shadow banking. Regulation should limit 
the leverage of shadow banking by way of minimum haircuts regulation on assets being used as 
collateral for funding 
Finally, we have reviewed the regulation of shadow banking in the U.S. and the EU based on the insights 
from economic analysis. We found that such regulation is both entity-based and instrument-based. 
Although the latter is to be preferred in theory, the practical difficulties of monitoring leverage at the 
assets level imply that the regulation of financial collateral should be combined with an indirect 
regulation of institutional leverage, through the prudential regulation of banks providing explicit or 
implicit liquidity puts to shadow banking. Unfortunately, risk-insensitive restrictions of leverage 
undermine the efficiency of banking, whether official or shadow.  
We acknowledge that the implementation of an optimal regulation of shadow banking faces two 
important challenges. First, it is difficult to identify the optimal levels of asset and institutional leverage. 
Second, it is even more difficult to adapt these levels to new circumstances. These challenges, however, 
apply as well to banking in general. A way to address them may be to provide financial regulators with 
some discretion under incentive-compatible regulatory governance. This is an interesting avenue for 
future research. 
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